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1. Introduction 
Several noted economists and prominent international organizations have recently 
advocated for the implementation of guest worker programs in developed states.1 Their primary 
argument is that guest worker programs would serve as a powerful mechanism for reducing 
global poverty and inequality. For example, economist Dani Rodrik estimates that guest worker 
programs in wealthy states would generate $200 billion or more annually for poor countries. 
According to Rodrik, liberalizing the temporary movement of workers would “produce the 
largest possible gains for the world economy, and for poor countries in particular” in comparison 
with other policies, such as trade liberalization.2  
While guest worker programs have received favorable treatment from economists, 
political philosophers have typically condemned guest worker programs. Michael Walzer 
famously argues that guest worker programs are “tyrannies” that create dominating conditions 
for immigrants.3 David Miller comments that guest worker programs “seem socially unjust” and 
that the “shortcomings of such [guest worker schemes] are easy to detect.”4 Joseph Carens 
contends that guest worker programs are typically impermissible departures from a democratic 
norm of equal treatment.5 Other authors have broadly echoed these conclusions.6  
I will sketch an argument for guest worker programs. By “guest workers,” I mean 
temporary immigrants who are admitted with the following bundle of rights and access to goods: 
  (i) Civil Liberties: due process, trial by jury, freedom of speech, etc. 
  (ii) Basic public entitlements, such as emergency healthcare. 
(iii) Basic public goods: national defense, law and order, transportation 
infrastructure, etc.  
 
In contrast, full citizens in liberal democratic states have access to (iv-viii) as well as (i-iii): 
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  (iv) Public pension programs. 
  (v) Social welfare programs. 
  (vi) Access to the full labor market. 
  (vii) Right to vote. 
  (viii) Right to indefinitely remain in residence.7 
 
My argument for guest worker programs is this. Compatriots have special obligations to one 
another and obligations of assistance to the global poor. While states can in principle permissibly 
deny entry to potential immigrants if all relevant obligations of assistance are satisfied, states 
must in practice discharge some obligations of assistance by admitting immigrants. Yet the 
special obligations that compatriots have to one another can justify placing restrictions on 
immigrants. In particular, these special obligations justify admitting immigrants through 
temporary guest worker programs under some empirically plausible circumstances.  
Here is a schematic overview of my argument:  
(P1) Wealthy states are morally required to admit a large number of low-skilled immigrants in 
order to satisfy global duties of assistance. 
 
(P2) If (P1) is true, wealthy states are morally required to admit these immigrants as guest 
workers or as eventual full citizens. 
 
(P3) The citizens of wealthy states incur a smaller risk of violating special obligations to one 
another if they admit some of these immigrants as guest workers than as eventual full 
citizens. 
 
(P4) There are strong pro tanto moral reasons8 for the citizens of wealthy states to incur less 
rather than more risk of violating special obligations to one another in satisfying global 
duties of assistance. 
 
(C) Therefore, wealthy states are morally required to admit a large number of low-skilled 
immigrants as guest workers or as eventual full citizens and there are strong pro tanto 
moral reasons for the citizens of wealthy states to admit some of these immigrants as 
guest workers rather than as citizens. 
 
Call this: The Central Argument.  
In sections 2-4, I will argue for the main premises of the Central Argument. In sections 5-
7, I will defend the Central Argument against objections. I will ultimately claim that my defense 
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of the Central Argument is inconclusive in certain respects, but also that the Central Argument is 
more plausible than many philosophical critics of guest worker programs have suggested.   
 
2. Compatriot Partiality 
In this section, I will argue for two positions: 





Stronger Obligations. Obligations of distributive justice between compatriots are more 
demanding than obligations of distributive justice to foreigners.  
 
Call the conjunction of Special Obligations and Stronger Obligations: Compatriot Partiality. In 
arguing for Compatriot Partiality, my goal is this. I will later claim that mass immigration might 
compromise the ability of compatriots to discharge their obligations to one another. If so, then 
temporary guest worker programs appear comparatively more attractive, insofar as Compatriot 
Partiality is true. 
Compatriot Partiality is a view about the moral status of the special relationships between 
individuals who stand in a position of common membership in a political community. The 
special relationship between compatriots activates obligations of distributive justice and these 
obligations have greater weight than comparable obligations to outsiders. Citizens have stringent 
special obligations to secure just distributive shares for their compatriots and prevent a certain 
degree of inequality from obtaining between them. Members of a political community lack an 
equivalently weighty obligation to secure an equal opportunity to the citizens of other countries. 
For my purposes, the crucial claims of Compatriot Partiality are: citizens have a special duty to 
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minimize inequalities in opportunities or resources between them and this duty has greater 
stringency than obligations to assist foreigners. 
 Philosophers have advanced a variety of justifications for Compatriot Partiality. The most 
common and, in my mind, promising strategy for justifying Compatriot Partiality is to identify 
some morally relevant features of the relationships that compatriots have to one another that they 
lack with respect to outsiders. Two plausible (non-exclusive) candidates include: 
Mutual Coercion. Compatriots coerce each other by imposing a system of laws and 
political and economic institutions on one another. As the imposition of these institutions 
and laws prima facie infringes on people’s autonomy and pervasively impacts their lives, 
this system of mutual coercion activates special obligations to ensure that the system of 
laws and institutions is fair to those who are coerced.9  
 
Reciprocity. Compatriots jointly contribute to the provision of essential public goods and 
stand in other cooperative relationships with one another that trigger obligations of 
reciprocity. These obligations of reciprocity require citizens to ensure that the jointly-
created benefits and burdens of social cooperation are fairly distributed.10  
 
I will argue that Mutual Coercion and Reciprocity support both Special Obligations and Stronger 
Obligations. 
 Mutual Coercion and Reciprocity entail special obligations of distributive justice if the 
following is true: 
(1) For either (a) the coercive imposition of institutions and laws to be fair, or (b) the 
benefits and burdens of social cooperation to be fair, they need to be structured in 
a manner that is consistent with egalitarian principles of justice. 
 
These egalitarian principles may include fair equality of opportunity or some other distributive 
egalitarian principles. I do not need to specify the precise principles at stake here. The important 
point is that the path from Mutual Coercion or Reciprocity to Special Obligations is this: certain 
features of social relationships activate obligations of fairness to compatriots and these 
obligations of fairness require some presumptively egalitarian distribution of opportunities or 
resources. As these relationships are especially salient among compatriots, they also support 
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Stronger Obligations. Thus, if either Mutual Coercion or Reciprocity is true, and some additional 
empirical assumptions hold, then they entail Compatriot Partiality.  
Notice that the above justification for Compatriot Partiality also supports: 
 Global Scope. There are global special obligations of distributive justice. 
 
if the following is true: 
(2) Coercive and cooperative relationships of the right kind now extend around the 
world. 
 
(2) appears to be true. There are international institutions that are, at least arguably, coercive and 
that provide global public goods. Other important cooperative relationships span the globe as 
well. These facts, together with either Mutual Coercion or Reciprocity, suggest Global Scope. 
However, Global Scope is potentially compatible with Compatriot Partiality if some ancillary 
assumptions are in place. Suppose first that: 
(3) The strength of the special obligations that are generated by Mutual Coercion or 
Reciprocity is at least partly proportionate to the degree to which coercive or 
cooperative social relationships obtain between individuals. 
 
This assumption is plausible enough; the stringency or weight of special obligations must 
somehow be sensitive to the intensity of the relationships that activate them. Next: 
(4) The extent of coercion and the intensity of cooperative ties exist to a greater 
degree within most political communities—that is, between compatriots—than 
they do globally.  
 
If (4) is correct—and it does seem very plausible indeed—Mutual Coercion and Reciprocity 
justify the thesis that compatriots owe each other stronger obligations of distributive justice than 
they owe to foreigners, even if these obligations obtain globally as well. Global Scope and 
Compatriot Partiality are in this sense entirely consistent with one another.   
Of course, I have said nothing to directly justify Mutual Coercion and Reciprocity here. 
Others have done so at length and I have little to add to their arguments. Mutual Coercion and 
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Reciprocity will simply be premises of my argument for guest worker programs. Yet Mutual 
Coercion and Reciprocity are plausible and support the common belief that compatriots owe 
each other some special regard and concern. Furthermore, Mutual Coercion and Reciprocity also 
provides support for the widely accepted contention that the demands of global distributive 
justice are increasing in tandem with the growth of international cooperation and institutions.  
 
3.  The Ethics of Low-Skilled Immigration 
This section will argue for two conclusions: 
 
(5) Low-skilled immigration to developed states may compromise the ability of the 




(6) It is necessary for the members of developed states to admit a large number of 
low-skilled immigrants in order to satisfy their global obligations of assistance. 
 
 
A. Empirical Background 
Some empirical evidence suggests that low-skilled immigration can have adverse effects on 
the receiving societies. George Borjas’s research finds that immigration to the United States has 
lowered the average wage of American citizens by 3 percent. Immigration has caused a nearly 9 
percent loss in wages for some low-skilled American citizens, such as high school dropouts.11 
Although these losses diminish over time, they remain significant. Another study by Borjas et al. 
concludes that immigration has a negative impact on the employment opportunities and wages of 
African American men. Immigration explains as much as 40 percent of the decline in 
employment among this group during the past several decades.12 Other research indicates that 
immigration contributes to income inequality because immigrants drive down wages among low-
skilled workers.13 Each of these studies is subject to dispute, but they together support the 
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conclusion that immigration can stand in tension with the promotion of an egalitarian distribution 
of income and wealth in the receiving society.  
There is also evidence that immigration can lower social solidarity and put pressure on 
the welfare state. High rates of immigration may be correlated with a slower growth of welfare 
spending. According to one study, “the typical industrial society might spend 16 or 17 percent 
more than it now does on social services had it kept its foreign-born percentage where it was in 
1970.”14 An explanation for this regularity is that immigration brings about more diversity and 
citizens resist the transfer of resources to culturally and ethnically distinct groups.15 Several 
authors view the differences in welfare spending between the United States and Western 
European countries as a result of greater ethnic diversity in the United States, which reduced 
support for a sizable welfare state.16 Robert Putnam argues that the “inhabitants of diverse 
communities tend to withdraw from collective life” and “to distrust their neighbours, regardless 
of the colour of their skin, to withdraw even from close friends…to volunteer less, give less to 
charity and work on community projects less often.”17 Immigration and the resulting cultural 
pluralism can lead to a loss of civic engagement, trust, and lower support for public social 
spending.18   
Of course, these empirical findings do not constitute all of the morally relevant facts. We 
must also ask: how much have the immigrants benefited from migrating? Estimates indicate that 
low-skilled immigrants from Mexico raise their wages by over 400 percent after they migrate to 
the United States.19 Unskilled Salvadorians increase their annual incomes from about $1,200 to 
$18,000.20 Immigration has positive spillover effects, particularly low-skilled immigration. 
When immigrants leave, they can tighten the labor markets of their home countries and cause 
wages to rise. Mexican immigration to the United States seems to have increased wages in 
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several Mexican states by 6 to 9 percent.21 Migrants from developing countries send home about 
$300 billion annually in remittances, which is approximately three times the size of all official 
development assistance.22 An influential World Bank study finds that, if high-income countries 
admitted 14.2 million new immigrants, the developing world would receive $305 billion in net 
income.23 Several comparative analyses of the benefits of trade liberalization, migration, and 
foreign aid conclude that the liberalization of immigration restrictions would benefit people in 
the developing world more than other anti-poverty policies.24 
Historical evidence supports the view that immigration can be a potent force for reducing 
poverty and inequality. Immigration is currently the most restrictive element of international 
exchange. A large number of states have liberalized trade and finance, but they oppose opening 
up of their labor markets to immigrants. In contrast, few barriers to immigration existed in the 
Western hemisphere in the late nineteenth century. Kevin O’Rourke and Jeffrey Williamson 
have analyzed the effects of immigration during this period and argue that migration accounts for 
the entirety of economic convergence between rich and poor countries: “all...of the [global] real 
wage convergence between 1870 and 1910 was attributable to migration.”25 The potential of 
migration to curtail global inequality is substantial in light of the evidence from the late 
nineteenth century. 
 
B. Immigration Restrictions and Foreign Aid 
 Mass low-skilled immigration to developed countries may compromise the ability of 
compatriots to satisfy special obligations to each other. If the above empirical research on the 
impact of low-skilled immigration is accurate, low-skilled immigration can harm vulnerable 
citizens, increase material inequality, and erode the social solidarity that underpins the welfare 
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state. These are serious concerns. If the only obligations at stake were special obligations of 
distributive justice between compatriots, they might justify denying entry to many low-skilled 
immigrants.  
However, I have also argued that there are global obligations of distributive justice. This 
is given by the fact that relationships of cooperation and coercion span the globe. These 
obligations must be satisfied as well, despite their possible weakness relative to obligations 
between compatriots. Even if Global Scope is false, there are certainly humanitarian obligations 
to the global poor that recommend a policy of open borders on the part of developed countries, 
especially in light of the evidence of the beneficial effects of immigration on global poverty.  
These reflections support: 
Conflicting Obligations. If the citizens of wealthy states satisfy global obligations by 
admitting large numbers of low-skilled immigrants, they risk violating special obligations 
to one another.  
 
Wealthy states might avoid Conflicting Obligations if the following argument is sound: 
(P1) A state can permissibly deny entry to foreigners if this state can feasibly satisfy all 
relevant duties of assistance through other means besides permitting immigration.  
 
(P2) A state can feasibly satisfy all relevant duties of assistance through other means besides 
permitting immigration (through, for example, foreign aid). 
 
(C) Therefore, a state can permissibly deny entry to foreigners. 
 
Call this: The Other Means Argument. Christopher Wellman articulates this argument in a 
question: “why cannot wealthy countries fully discharge their global distributive duties without 
including the recipients in their political union, simply by transferring the required level of funds 
abroad?”26 Wellman later adds: “global poverty requires wealthy states to either export aid or 
import unfortunate people” and he evidently assumes that it is feasible for wealthy states to 
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satisfy their obligations via foreign aid, thus rendering it permissible for states to close their 
borders.  
 Yet there is good reason to believe that P2 of the Other Means Argument is false. 
Although wealthy states can no doubt satisfy some of their global obligations via international 
redistribution, it is exceedingly unlikely that they can satisfy all of them in this fashion. There is 
now an enormous empirical literature on the effectiveness of foreign aid and much of it is 
skeptical. In general, empirical studies have been unable to consistently find a large positive 
causal relationship between foreign aid and economic growth.27 Why? Several problems beset 
foreign aid to developing countries: 
(7) Loss of Accountability. Foreign aid inflows cause an erosion of governmental 
accountability in developing countries because political elites no longer need to 
extract revenue from the local population, as they can depend on external support. 
This undermines the responsiveness of governments and damages the quality of 
institutions. In this respect, foreign aid has effects that are similar to the “resource 
curse.”28 
 
(8) Diversion. Foreign aid can be often diverted away from its original purpose in 
poverty alleviation and development and into the hands of a corrupt bureaucracy 
and patronage system. Sometimes foreign aid may even be diverted into financing 
wars and regional arms races, with evident detrimental effects on the global 
poor.29  
 
(9) Macroeconomic Effects. Foreign aid inflows cause real exchange overvaluation in 
developing countries, which damages the capacity of these countries to develop a 
manufacturing base and promote exporting industries.30 
 
It seems that (7-9) explain in large part why development assistance has been only intermittently 
effective. While (7-9) certainly fall far short of showing that aid is never effective, they do 
indicate that P2 is in all likelihood false. In the actual world, the citizens of developed countries 
cannot satisfy their obligations at a distance purely via international transfers. Foreign aid alone 
is probably inadequate. Therefore, at least one version of the Other Means Argument fails.31  
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 However, some authors also doubt whether developed states can satisfy their global 
obligations by allowing immigration. David Miller writes: 
A policy of open migration may make [the global poor] worse off still, if it allows doctors, 
engineers, and other professionals to move from economically undeveloped to 
economically developed societies in search of higher incomes, thereby depriving their 
countries of origin of vital skills.32  
 
Miller is making a “brain drain” argument against a policy of open immigration. The thought is 
that permitting open immigration would deprive poor societies of important human capital and 
thus reinforce global poverty. One problem with this argument is that it is challenged by recent 
empirical studies on the effects of skilled immigration. If the highly skilled emigrate, this may 
raise the returns to education in the home country and provide incentives for more natives to 
educate themselves, thereby compensating for the losses in human capital.33 Moreover, even if 
the brain drain argument is correct, Miller ignores an obviously solution: developed countries 
could admit a proportionately higher number of low-skilled workers. This solution would avoid 
the problem with a brain drain altogether, although it would exacerbate the potentially negative 
effects of low-skilled immigration highlighted above. I will return to this issue in section 4. 
 There might be other more viable interpretations of Other Means Argument available. 
Instead of investing in foreign aid, developed countries can perhaps satisfy their obligations by 
investing in technology or, more radically, by forcibly erecting more just institutions in some 
developing countries. I am unable to rule these alternatives out in principle, but I believe that 
they too are extremely unlikely to render P2 of the Other Means Argument true in practice. To 
reiterate, I am not arguing against using variety of mechanisms through which wealthy societies 
might satisfy obligations to the developing world. Foreign aid, investments in technology, and 
perhaps humanitarian intervention are all arguably part of a package of policies that may 
successfully discharge global obligations of assistance. My claim is merely that a policy of 
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admitting some large number of low-skilled immigrants is likely a necessary component of that 
package of policies. If so, the Other Means Argument is unsuccessful and the tension between 
obligations between compatriots and global obligations of assistance remains.  
 
4. The Case for Guest Worker Programs 
In this section, I will propose another (at least partial) solution to Conflicting Obligations. 
My claim is: 
(10) If wealthy states implemented guest worker programs, this could lower the risk 
that citizens would violate special obligations to one another in discharging global 
obligations of assistance, compared to a policy of purely admitting low-skilled 
immigrants as eventual full citizens.  
 
Here are some of the potential advantages of guest worker programs. Guest programs can reduce 
the cultural and social impact of immigration by ensuring that immigration is temporary and can 
restrict immigrants to working in specific sectors of the economy where they avoid competing 
with citizens. Guest programs prohibit guest workers from receiving many public welfare 
benefits and this would potentially lower the pressure that immigration can have on the welfare 
state. Furthermore, the experience of some guest worker programs suggests that guest programs 
can facilitate a more egalitarian distribution of wealth and opportunities in the host society. I will 
now elaborate on these features of guest worker programs. 
 The Welfare State. As I noted in section 3, some empirical studies argue that immigration 
causally leads to a reduction in support for the welfare state and social spending because citizens 
resist redistribution to cultural and ethnic minorities. Guest workers lack access to most social 
welfare programs. Thus, immigration through guest worker programs would not reduce support 
for social spending, provided that natives recognize that guest workers will not receive benefits 
from social welfare programs.  
 13 
 
 Labor Market Restrictions. If low-skilled immigrants would harm some significant 
number of disadvantaged citizens by competing with them for employment, then guest worker 
programs might reduce this harm this by preventing immigrants from accessing the entire labor 
market. Guest worker programs could restrict immigrants to certain sectors of the labor market 
where few citizens seek employment.  
 Egalitarian Redistribution. Some guest worker programs may promote an egalitarian 
distribution of income and wealth in host societies. Here is an example: guest programs for 
immigrants who help care for dependents and assist in household maintenance. Michael Kremer 
and Stanley Watt argue that large-scale guest worker programs for domestic workers have an 
egalitarian effect on the income distribution of the host country.34 If guest workers perform more 
domestic labor, more citizens can work in market production. Consequently, a guest worker 
program for domestic laborers could increase total economic output because more women would 
participate in the official labor market. Educated women who enter the labor market compete 
with other educated workers. Competition among skilled workers causes wages to decline. This 
process would have the effect of compressing wage disparities. The result is a more egalitarian 
distribution of income in the host country. If Kremer and Watt’s analysis is correct, then certain 
guest worker programs can actually help satisfy the special obligations of distributive justice that 
obtain between compatriots.  
 Benefits to Global Poor. In section 3, I reviewed empirical evidence that indicates that 
low-skilled immigration has impressive benefits for the global poor. Furthermore, a guest worker 
program would avoid the problems with brain drains highlighted above, supposing that these 
problems are in fact empirically supported. Immigrants would be temporary residents—they 
would acquire work experience and then return to their countries of origin.  
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To avoid confusion, my precise claim is:  




(12) Some actual guest worker programs avoid or have avoided Conflicting 
Obligations. 
 
My arguments here are mainly intended to support (11). The practical force of my argument, 
however, will depend on judgments of feasibility and the truth or falsity of (12) bears on this 
question. It may turn out that most guest worker programs that have the benefits that I have 
sketched are unfeasible. I will be unable to argue conclusively against this possibility. I will, 
nonetheless, provide some support for (11) and suggest that guest worker programs do deserve 
more consideration from political philosophers than they have received.  
I now discuss objections to guest worker programs. These objections are that guest 
worker programs harm or wrong immigrants and have negative side effects on the host society. If 
these objections are sound, we have reason to conclude that the disadvantages of guest worker 
programs easily outweigh their benefits. I will defend guest worker programs against these 
objections, but I concede that these objections have a point and that the argument for guest 
worker programs might be inconclusive in practice. Note, however, that the arguments in this 
section provide support for the view that the conflict between low-skilled immigration and 
Compatriot Partiality is to some extent illusory. If suitably designed, a guest worker program can 
minimize this conflict.  
 
5. The Domination Objection 
In his influential discussion of guest worker programs, Michael Walzer’s advances: 
The Domination Objection.  
(a) Dominating institutions are impermissible.
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(b) Guest worker programs are dominating. 
 
Walzer observes that guest workers “experience the state as a pervasive and frightening power 
that shapes their lives and regulates their every move—and never asks for their opinion. 
Departure is only a formal option; deportation, a continuous practical threat.” The host state and 
private employers can arbitrarily interfere with the choices and rights of guest workers. Under 
guest worker programs, the host state might revoke the rights of guest workers and deport them 
without warning. Private employers can exercise substantial control over the lives of some guest 
workers, particularly domestic workers who live in the homes of their employers. Walzer’s 
claims suggest that guest worker programs are impermissible regardless of whether immigrants 
consent to the terms of their contracts—the consent of guest workers “given at a single moment 
in time, while it is sufficient to legitimize market transactions, is not sufficient for democratic 
politics.”35  
 Are guest worker programs in fact dominating? Here is a reason to think that the answer 
to this question is sometimes yes. According to one influential analysis of domination, A 
dominates B if A has the capacity to interfere with the choices of B in a manner that ignores B’s 
interests or judgment.36 A host state might dominate guest workers in this sense, as the host state 
has the capacity to interfere with the choices of guest workers without giving them a formal 
opportunity to influence policy or sufficient legal protection from employers and other parties.  
Yet the Domination Objection is not a general objection to guest worker programs. As I 
will also discuss in section 6, guest worker programs can have clear guidelines about the duration 
of the contract and permit immigrants to plan to earn a relatively high wage and then return 
home. All liberal democratic states admit temporary residents, such as foreign students and 
tourists, and restrict their access to public entitlements, social welfare programs, and the labor 
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market. If this practice is not objectionably dominating, then some guest worker programs can 
have the same status, as the admission of temporary residents and guest worker programs share 
many of the same salient characteristics.  
Walzer in fact acknowledges that guest workers need not always be dominating. Walzer 
proposes a reform that would minimize the domination of guest workers: “the host countries 
might undertake to negotiate formal treatises with the home countries, setting out in authoritative 
form a list of guest rights.”37 Under these treatises, guest workers would enjoy many of the legal 
protections of citizenship and the governments of their home countries would pressure the host 
countries into enforcing these protections. Setting aside the issue of whether Walzer’s specific 
proposal is desirable or feasible, we should in general accept the claim that guest worker 
programs are not in principle impermissibly dominating.  
Nonetheless, Walzer’s objection does point to a serious worry about guest worker 
programs. Although it is possible to imagine guest worker programs that are not objectionably 
dominating, in practice these programs may be difficult to devise and sustain. I will return to this 
problem in section 6 and the conclusion.  
 
6. Externalities 
One of the most powerful objections to guest worker programs is that they have harmful 
side effects on the host society. Opponents of guest worker programs argue that guest workers 
will overstay their contracts and establish roots in the host society. Because they lack an 
opportunity to become full members of this society, guest workers and their families will form an 
underclass with an oppositional subculture that resists integration. Among others, William 
Kymlicka advances this thesis and argues that “the predictable consequence [of a guest worker 
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program] can involve some mixture of political alienation, criminality, and religious 
fundamentalism amongst the immigrants, particularly the second generation.”38 The crucial 
claim here is that guest worker programs will generate negative externalities for the host society 
in virtue of the fact that guest workers will violate the terms of their contracts.  
The claim that guest workers will overstay draws support from the experience of the 
German program for Turkish guest workers during the 1960s and 70s. Many Turkish guest 
workers did overstay and formed a disenfranchised and alienated underclass that was resistant to 
integration. Only comparatively recently have former guest workers in Germany and their 
children acquired access to full citizenship. The German experience supports the argument that 
guest worker programs are both unviable and produce unacceptable negative externalities. 
Invoking the failures of the German program, Kymlicka writes that the “[e]mpircally, it has 
become clear that [guest workers] who have lived in a country for several years are highly 
unlikely to go home, even if they have only precarious legal status.”39 
There are several responses to the position that guest worker programs are invariably 
permanent. It is worth pointing out that a large majority of guest workers in Germany did return 
home.40 It is also a mistake to generalize from the German program to all guest worker programs. 
The German program permitted most guest workers to stay for an indefinite amount of time and 
bring their families, which predictably encouraged guest workers to settle in Germany. Courts 
affirmed the rights of guest workers to remain in Germany because the guest program failed to 
be explicit about the duration of stay and the renewability of temporary contracts.41 Other guest 
worker programs have to a greater extent avoided these problems. If the host state explicitly 
specifies the terms under which guest workers will be required to leave and enforces these terms, 
then a guest worker program can minimize overstaying. The experience of Singapore, Hong 
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Kong, and other states shows that it is possible to sustain temporary and large-scale guest worker 
programs for decades.42 The difference is that host states must have the resolve to deport guest 
workers when they have violated their contracts to ensure that guest workers are genuinely 
temporary. 
However, it is hardly a coincidence that Singapore, Hong Kong, and other states with 
massive guest worker programs are less than fully democratic. The citizens of liberal democratic 
states may find a policy of mass deportation to be excessively harsh and this widespread 
sentiment is partly responsible for the failure of guest worker programs in these states. Yet there 
are other policy options available to liberal democratic states that can help sustain temporary 
programs that avoid coercive deportations. One proposal that various authors have suggested is 
to withhold part of the income of guest workers and reimburse them only when they return 
home. Another option is to make firms responsible for repatriating guest workers such that they 
must pay penalties if guest workers overstay their contracts. I will avoid engaging in detailed 
analysis of these proposals here. My point is merely that it is far from inevitable that a large 
fraction of guest workers will violate their contracts and continue as permanent residents. 
Additionally, guest programs can benefit the host society substantially even if some fraction of 
the workers fails to return home.43 
 
7. Conclusion 
This table illustrates the advantages and disadvantages of a well-designed guest worker 
program in comparison with unrestricted low-skilled immigration: 
 Advantages Disadvantages 
Immigration Outside of 
Guest Programs 
-Benefits Global Poor -Possible Brain Drain 
-Harms low-skilled citizens 




-May undermine support for 
welfare state 
Well-Designed and 
Enforced Guest Programs 
-Benefits Global Poor 
-No Brain Drain 
-May Promote Egalitarian 
Distribution of Income in Host 
Society 
-May protect low-skilled citizens 
-Avoids undermining support for 
welfare state 
-Danger of domination 
-Danger of overstaying 
 
 
Suppose that a feasible guest worker program could in fact have these advantages and 
disadvantages. A guest worker program would then help resolve Conflicting Obligations, at least 
relative to low-skilled immigration outside of guest worker programs. This seems to license the 
third premise of the Central Argument: 
The citizens of wealthy states incur a smaller risk of violating special obligations to one 
another if they admit some of these [low-skilled] immigrants as guest workers than as 
eventual full citizens. 
 
If the other premises of the Central Argument are true, it follows that: 
Wealthy states are morally required to admit a large number of low-skilled immigrants as 
guest workers or as eventual full citizens and there are strong pro tanto moral reasons for 
the citizens of wealthy states to admit some of these immigrants as guest workers rather 
than as citizens. 
 
Several qualifications to this argument are necessary.  
First, there might be other immigration policies besides guest worker programs that I 
have neglected to discuss that also satisfy the relevant global and domestic obligations. Given 
that other such arrangements might exist, a wealthy state could permissibly select one of these 
alternative policies instead (whatever they might be).  
Second, I have refrained from commenting on how many immigrants should be admitted 
as guest workers in order to deliver the benefits described above. This is a difficult empirical 
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question and I am unable to answer it here with any competence. At any rate, the answer surely 
depends on the details of particular cases.  
Third, if the conclusion of the Central Argument is true, it may have limited practical 
significance if morally permissible guest worker programs are infeasible. Although I have argued 
that permissible guest worker programs are feasible, I have also provided some reasons to doubt 
whether this is so. Perhaps any actual guest worker program would have negative effects that 
render it less preferable to a policy of admitting low-skilled immigrants with more entitlements 
than guest workers. I have failed to rule this possibility out. Consequently, the practical 
significance of the Central Argument remains an open question.44  
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